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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. RICHARD V. ALLEN
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Q's and A's on Ambassador Kirkpatrick's Statement in the Security Council June 19

The attached Q's and A's have been prepared by the Department for use by our Spokesman in handling questions from the press on Ambassador Kirkpatrick's statement June 19 on Security Council resolution concerning the Israeli attack on the Iraqi nuclear facility. We are also circulating these Q's and A's to the Defense Department, the Secretary's party in Manila and to Ambassador Kirkpatrick with the thought that the principal agencies would respond to any press queries along the same lines.

E. Paul Hoffer, III
Executive Secretary

Attachment:
As stated.

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Q: The Draft Resolution notes "... that Israel has not adhered to the NPT." Will the USG attempt to persuade Israel to reconsider its position and accede to the Treaty?

A: The US believes that all states should adhere to the NPT. US support for the NPT -- and for a more vigorous non-proliferation policy -- is based on a belief that the spread of weapons can only increase the danger and destructiveness of war and complicate the pursuit of peace. Israel has of course introduced a proposal for a nuclear weapons free zone in the Middle East which would inevitably entail acceptance of safeguards. Negotiation of any such arrangement would require the parties involved to recognize the legitimacy of the state of Israel -- something which Iraq and other regional states refuse to do. We hope nonetheless that we will be able to make progress on this issue as well as the broader question, to which this is related, of peace in the region.

Q: The D.R. states that "the said attack constitutes a serious threat against the IAEA safeguards regime which is the foundation of the NPT." Ambassador Stoessel noted yesterday that "while the NPT and IAEA safeguards regime are still critical to any non-proliferation effort, we can all agree that we should work to strengthen today's safeguards and further allay the kind of suspicions and mistrust that contributed to Israel's action." He went on to say that "the non-proliferation policy guidelines we will soon be discussing with you take explicit account of these facts." What guidelines do we have in mind? When can we expect such discussions to begin? Given the admitted imperfection of the existing guidelines, how can we base our condemnation, even if only in part, on this violation?

A: -- The Administration has been conducting a comprehensive review of its non-proliferation policy since before the Israeli raid, the results of which will be made known shortly. I can't comment on the outcome of that review until it is completed.

-- While we regard the NPT and IAEA safeguards system as critical to any non-proliferation effort, they are not infallible and under certain circumstances might not be sufficient to allay suspicions or mistrust on the part of other countries. We therefore think that it is important to strengthen the safeguard system where possible.

-- Nothing would do greater violence to the NPT and the IAEA than for states to use these instruments as a way of pursuing nuclear activities that are intended to be

— At the same time, we regard the NPT/IAEA safeguards system as an absolutely critical basis for any non-proliferation effort. This is the basis for our vote for the UK Draft Resolution.

— We certainly do not believe that our desire to strengthen IAEA safeguards and to allay distrust [illegible] justification for the Israeli action.

Q: Ambassador Kirkpatrick's statement says that "We must act urgently to ensure the security of all nations in the Middle East" including "the security of all peoples to know that a neighbor is not seeking technology for purposes of destruction." What urgent action are we proposing? How and in what time frame will we proceed?

A: We are moving urgently forward on the question of regional security and are engaged in continuing efforts to develop the means whereby the states in the region can feel assured of their security against aggression, terrorism and subversion, particularly from the Soviet Union and its surrogates like Libya which constitute the preeminent threat to regional security. We also intend to move forward urgently on the peace process in active consultation with Egypt, Israel, and other countries inside and outside of the area. In addition, we are working to limit or avoid the presence of sensitive nuclear materials and technologies, particularly in areas like the Middle East.

Finally, we are continuing our efforts to resolve through diplomatic means other conflicts in the area such as the one that now threatens Lebanon.

Q: The statement notes that the USG "cannot and will not support the use of force when all diplomatic approaches have not been exhausted." What diplomatic approaches should or could Israel have taken under the circumstances? And if Israel gone through these motions are we to understand that it would have then been justified in making the June 7 raid?

A: We feel strongly that diplomatic options for resolving Israel's concerns were not exhausted. We have been in ongoing efforts to meet those concerns with appropriate governments and through international institutions. We cannot say precisely what measures the Israeli government should have taken, but there were alternative approaches. For example, they could have made a very urgent approach to the new government in France which had been on record as being very sympathetic to their concerns in this area.

Q. What, in view of the USG, constitutes appropriate redress? Who will make this determination? How will it be made? How could it be enforced?

A. The states directly concerned would have to decide whether to seek redress, and if so, in what form and in what forum.

Attachment:
Text

Clearances: NEA:WCHarrington
S/P:

Q. Will the USG actively use its influence to persuade Israel to accede to placing its facilities under IAEA safeguards? What are the prospects for success?

A. [illegible] Israel to ratify the NPT and accept [illegible]. Israel has taken the position that it cannot [illegible] the continued state of war that exists for the Middle East [illegible] its survival. Israel has also [illegible] that it would not be the first state to introduce [illegible] to the Middle East. We will continue to [illegible] safeguards surrounding nuclear programs [illegible] and the world so that all nations [illegible] the confidence that would enable [illegible]

Q. The DR takes note of the IAEA Board of Governors' Resolution of 12 June 1981. Does this mean that our position on that resolution is in any way affected by this resolution?

A. No. As Ambassador Kirkpatrick noted in the explanation of the US vote the US voted against and continues to oppose the resolution in the IAEA which is referred to in the resolution.

NEA:EWalker

Clearances: NEA:WEdwards
S/P:
PM:

BASIS OF US CONDEMNATION

Q: How can we vote for a Security Council resolution describing the Israeli action as a clear violation of the U.N. Charter when we have not completed our own review of whether Israel acted in self defense?

A: Our criticism of Israel's action stems from her failure to seek a peaceful resolution of the dispute. Not to do so is at variance with Article 2 of the Charter. Our support for the resolution carried no implication of other legal violations foreign or domestic.

Drafted by [illegible]